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The retiring farmer generally tries to balance the desire to keep the farm intact as a going concern with 
the need for a secure assets portfolio to finance retirement. This problem becomes more complex in 
situations where younger family members choose not to be active in the farm business. Tax-deferred 
savings are potentially an important component of a retirement plan and could represent a very 
substantial increase in tax-free assets for many individuals. This study examines the tax deferred 
retirement savings of farm households. The model is estimated using Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS) 1999 farm-level national data and the Double-Hurdle estimation 
method. Results indicate that farm household’s source of income, age of the farm operator, marginal 
tax rate, regional location, and participation in government programs are factors that significantly 
affect investment in tax-deferred savings.   
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AN ANALYSIS OF TAX-DEFERRED RETIREMENT SAVINGS OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
The retiring farmer generally tries to balance the desire to keep the farm intact as a going concern with 
the need for a secure source asset portfolio to finance retirement. This problem becomes more complex 
when younger family members choose not to be active in the farm business. Consequently, failure to 
plan carefully for retirement and the ultimate transfer of the estate can result in serious problems such 
as financial insecurity, personal and family dissatisfaction, and needless capital losses. Further, Frey 
points out that many farmers do little formal planning or investing specifically for retirement. The 
amount of wealth at stake is substantial for most farm families. In 2001, farm households had average 
net worth of $545,869, compared with $395,500 for non-farm households (Mishra et al.) 
 
To encourage employees or individuals not covered by private pension plans to save for retirement, as 
is the case for farmers, individual retirement accounts (IRA) were established by Congress in 1974 as 
part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Emphasizing the need to enhance economic 
well-being of future retirees and the need to increase national savings, the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981 extended the availability of IRAs to all employees (including the self-employed) and raised the 
contribution limit. Tax-deferred savings are potentially an important component of a retirement 
portfolio and could represent a very substantial increase in tax-free assets for many individuals. Over 
the years, several retirement savings plans for self-employed individuals have been established, to 
better serve small businesses, including farms. These plans include 401 (k), Keogh accounts, savings 
incentive match plans for employees for small employers (SIMPLE), and simplified employee pension 
(SEP). However, in recent years chronically low levels of U.S. private and public savings have 
generated considerable concern among academics and policymakers. Despite the retirement program’s  4
size and potential significance, surprisingly little is known about the determinants of tax-deferred 
retirement savings of farm households.  Thus the goal of this analysis is to analyze the effect of farm, 
operator, household, and other demographic characteristics on the participation of farm households in 
tax-deferred retirement savings. The study is conducted at the farm level nationwide with the unique 
feature of a larger sample than previously reported, comprising farms of different economic sizes and 
in different regions of the United States.  
 
Background 
The United States population is aging. By 2030 it is expected that one out of every five Americans will 
be 65 or older. If tomorrow’s retirees are like past retirees they will want a comfortable lifestyle in 
retirement. However, given the rising cost of living, increased health care costs, possible changes in 
Social Security, and a declining individual saving rate, they may be forced to accept a decreased 
standard of living in their retirement years. To avoid this, it is important for individuals to develop 
realistic investment plans that help meet their retirement goals. This is especially important for self-
employed people such as farmers and ranchers. A major challenge for the self-employed is that they 
must initiate their own retirement plans. Retirement plans and retirement savings can benefit the farm 
family and other employees of the farm. Yet, the perception of retirement is quite different for farmers 
and ranchers compared to all other households.  
 
Farm families, like many other families in America, have a diversified portfolio. Farm families hold 
both farm and nonfarm assets. The 1999 ARMS survey queried farm operators on off-farm assets, such 
as savings, retirement accounts, stocks, and other investments.  In general, off-farm assets comprised 
31 percent ($198,219) of total farm household assets, with $50,633 invested in tax-deferred retirement  5
accounts (TDRA). TDRAs contributed approximately 26 percent to total off-farm assets, second only 
to other investments (i.e., houses and property off the farm).  
 
Ownership of tax-deferred retirement accounts (TDRA) increases with both income and net worth. 
Ownership is also more likely among families headed by persons less than 65 years of age. The inverse 
relationship between age and ownership of TDRAs occurs for several reasons. First, even though 
retirement accounts have been in existence for about twenty years, they may not have become common 
until relatively late in the careers of people in the over 65 age group. Second, once a person reaches 
age 59½, funds in retirement accounts may be withdrawn without penalty, and some in the over 65 
group may have already done so. Third, families may have used funds from retirement accounts 
accumulated from previous employment to purchase an annuity at retirement. 
 
A comparison of TDRA savings of farm households, using 1999 ARMS data, with self-employed non-
farm families (using 2001 data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, SCF) shows that the median 
value of TDRAs of farm families ($12,500) is greater than TDRA savings of self-employed non-farm 
families ($9,300). The median value of TDRA savings of farm households and self-employed non-
farm households are substantially larger than the median TDRA savings of all non-farm families 
($300). The TDRA savings pattern for farm households is different in terms of income class, age of the 
farm operator, net worth, and income from business. Table 1 shows that a majority of farm households 
earning $25,000 or more have TDRA savings. However, TDRA savings in the case of the self-
employed non-farm family starts with annual earnings of $50,000 or more. An interesting point here is 
that farm households with income of $100,000 or more have less in TDRAs, half as much, as self-
employed non-farm households. Net worth is another factor that influences the saving behavior of  6
individuals. Table 1 shows that the median value of TDRA holdings increases with household net 
worth. For example, the top 10 percent of farm households in terms of net worth have median TDRA 
holdings of $45,000, which is well below that ($275,000) of the self-employed non-farm families and 
also that of all non-farm families ($125,000). The median TDRA savings by business income class 
provides quite a contrast, but it again emphasizes the point that large farms, where the majority of 
income is coming from farming, save less in TDRAs than their counterpart (self-employed) non-farm 
families. For example, non-farm businesses earning $500,000 or more have TDRA holdings four times 
larger ($110,000) than farm businesses in the same group ($27,063). An important result that emerges 
from Table 1 is that farm households under a certain income threshold are saving more than their non-




The effects of farm, operator, financial and household characteristics on TDRA savings are examined 
using cross-section survey data, which is not possible with aggregate time series data. The problem 
with cross-section survey data is that estimation procedures are complicated due to the existence of 
zero observations on the dependent variable (Cragg; Blisard and Blaylock). The Tobit model is a 
widely used traditional method for limited dependent variables that is very restrictive because it 
assumes that all zero observations represent standard corner solutions in the sense that positive savings 
would occur if some variables changed. This assumption may not be true in cases where some of the 
zeros result from ‘non participation’ decisions rather than corner solutions (Cragg; Jone; Blisard and  7
Blaylock). The most frequently applied model to deal with this problem is the Double-Hurdle model. 
This model was originally formulated by Cragg and builds on the foundations set by Tobin, who was 
the first to recognize the need for an alternative way to model a censored distribution of this kind.  
 
The underlying assumption of the Double-Hurdle model is that farm households make two decisions 
with respect to a product (in this study participation in TDRAs) in an effort to maximize their utility; 
whether to participate in TDRAs (participation decision), and how much to save. This process is 
determined by the same set of independent variables (Cragg). Therefore, in order to observe a positive 
level of TDRA savings two separate hurdles must be passed. Two separate latent variables are used to 
model each decision process with a Probit determining participation and a Tobit determining the 
saving level (Blundell and Meghir).  
    i i i     w     y      *
1      Participation  decision 
    i i i     x     y      *
2    Saving  decision  (1) 
The model: 
   
otherwise                      y
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where  *
1 i y is a latent variable describing the household’s decision to participate in TDRA savings; 
*
2 i y is the observed level of farm household TDRA savings;  i w is a vector of explanatory variables 
accounting for the participation decision;  i x  is a vector of explanatory variables accounting for the 
TDRA savings decision, and  i  , and  i  are respective error terms assumed to be independent and 
distributed as    2
i   0, N ~      and    2
i   0, N ~     . The model assumes that both participation and savings  8
equations are linear in their parameters  and . The Double-Hurdle model is estimated by 
maximizing the following equation
1. 
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where F(.) and f(.) are the standard normal cumulative and density functions, respectively, and  is the 
standard error.  
 
Data 
Data for the analysis are from the 1999 Agricultural Resources Management Survey (ARMS).  ARMS 
is conducted annually by the Economic Research Service and the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service. The survey collects data to measure the financial condition (farm income, expenses, assets, 
and debts) and operating characteristics of farm businesses, the cost of producing agricultural 
commodities, and the well-being of farm operator households.  
 
The target population of the survey is operators associated with farm businesses representing 
agricultural production in the 48 contiguous states. A farm is defined as an establishment that sold or 
normally would have sold at least $1,000 of agricultural products during the year. Farms can be 
organized as proprietorships, partnerships, family corporations, nonfamily corporations, or 
cooperatives. Data are collected from one operator per farm, the senior farm operator. A senior farm 
operator is the operator who makes most of the day-to-day management decisions. For the purpose of 
this study, operator households organized as nonfamily corporations or cooperatives and farms run by 
hired managers were excluded.  
                                                 
1 If the restriction   1   i w F is imposed, the likelihood equation for the Double-Hurdle model reduces to that of the 
Tobit model.  9
The 1999 ARMS survey collected information on farm households in addition to farm economic data 
collected through the regular survey. It contains detailed information on off-farm hours worked by 
spouses and farm operators, the amount of income received from off-farm work, net cash income from 
operating another farm/ranch, net cash income from operating another business, and net income from 
share renting. Furthermore, income received from other sources, such as disability, social security, and 
unemployment payments, and gross income from interest and dividends is also counted.  
 
In addition, the 1999 ARMS survey queried farmers on different types of financial, production, and 
investment assets including various retirement and saving accounts (IRA, 401K, Keogh and other 
retirement accounts). Farmers were queried, first about their participation in tax-deferred savings 
accounts and subsequently on the amount of savings in these accounts. Summary statistics for each of 
the variables utilized in the analysis are presented in Table 2.  
 
Since the tax rate for each individual was not available, we have assumed that households earning less 
that $30,000 do not pay any federal, state and local income taxes; households with gross income 
between $30,000 and $60,000 pay 15% in taxes; households earning between $60,000 and $200,000 
pay 25% in taxes; and households earning $200,000 or more pay 40% in taxes. Income of the 
household includes farm earnings, off-farm work (in the form of wages and salaries, and income from 
off-farm businesses), interest and dividends, social security and public assistance, and other off-farm 
sources of income minus taxes (Hoppe). The determinants of TDRA participation and savings level are 
assumed to be the same in this analysis because it is generally difficult to rationalize why one variable 
should affect participation but not the TDRA savings level or vice-versa (Blaylock and Blisard). 
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Results 
Estimated parameters for the Double-Hurdle model are reported in Table 3. Significance tests show 
that a large proportion of the estimated parameters are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 or 
higher level of significance. The Double-Hurdle estimates indicate that some independent variables 
have significantly different impacts on the participation and TDRA savings level decisions. The 
coefficient on OP_EDUC (operator’s level of education) is positive in both equations, but statistically 
significant only in the TDRA savings level decision. This suggests that education may not play an 
important role in whether to participate in a TDRA, but once the decision to participate has been made 
then the level of education matters. This is plausible as one would need to know the type of account 
where the investment is made (for example IRA, 401k, or Keogh plan). Choosing among these plans 
require knowledge (such as knowing the features of the account and how they may best serve a 
household) and research time, which is directly correlated with one’s educational attainment.  
 
Consistent with economic theory, the coefficient on OP_AGE is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level of significance. This indicates that the likelihood of participation and the amount to 
invest in a TDRA increase with age of the farm operator. This is consistent with the finding of Hill 
who finds a positive relationship between farmers’ age and wealth (farm wealth). Our results are also 
consistent with the findings of Venti and Wise.  However, age related investment reaches a peak and 
then disinvestment starts. This is evident by a negative coefficient on OP_AGESQ.  The results 
conform to the life-cycle hypothesis, in that at the early stages of their working life farmers save for 
retirement and in the later stages they disinvest for consumption.  
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Farm households are different than other self-employed non-farm households and in particular from all 
other non-farm households in terms of their employment (Hallberg et al.). Farm households typically 
have dual employment, farm and non-farm. They have multiple sources of income. Farm households 
earn income from farming, off-farm wages and salaries, off-farm businesses, farm rental payments, 
interest and dividends, and, other off-farm sources (see Mishra et al.). Therefore, to study the impact of 
income on participation and TDRA savings decisions we have separated farm household income into 
two components, farm (NET_CASH) and off-farm (OF_WAGE). The coefficient on OF_WAGE is 
positive and statistically significant in both equations. Results indicate that farm households with off-
farm income in the form of wages and salaries are more likely to invest in TDRAs and once the farm 
household decides to invest the amount of investment is also positively correlated with OF_WAGE. 
One interpretation is that many off-farm jobs, particularly wage and salaried jobs, have fringe benefits 
associated with them. The option to investment in TDRAs is attractive for the household as it 
decreases taxable income and provides a source of income in retirement. Our results are consistent 
with Collins and Wyckoff, who studied tax-favored retirement savings behavior of non-self-employed 
households. 
 
On the other hand, the coefficient on NET_CASH is negative and statistically significant in the 
participation model. Farm households receiving the majority of their income from farming, as many 
large and very large farms do, are less likely to participate in TDRAs. It is plausible that farm operators 
of large commercial farms view their farm as a primary source of retirement income. They are also 
much more likely to be full-time farmers. The coefficient on GOVT_PMT is negative and statistically 
significant only in the participation equation. Results show that farm households that received 
government payments are less likely to participate in tax-deferred retirement savings. One reason could  12
be that these households expect government payments to continue even when they retire (for example, 
conservation reserve payments). Additionally, most program participants tend to operate large farms 
and work as full-time farmers.  
 
One of the reasons to contribute to TDRAs is to reduce the household’s tax burden. Previous literature 
(Venti and Wise; O’Neil and Thompson; Hubbard; Becker and Fullerton; Collins and Wyckoff) 
identifies the marginal tax rate (individual or ad hoc basis) as a factor to explain the likelihood of 
participation in an IRA or tax-favored retirement savings. Since the marginal tax rates for farm 
households are not available we use constructed ad hoc marginal tax rates, as described in the data 
section, in the analysis. As expected, the coefficient on MG_TAX is positive and statistically 
significant in both equations (participation and TDRA savings) at the 1 percent level of significance. 
Results indicate that participation in a TDRA and the amount saved in a TDRA increase with the 
marginal tax rate. The associated marginal effect shows that a one percent increase in MG_TAX 
increases the likelihood of participating in a TDRA by 0.50 percent. Findings here support the 
argument that those able to obtain a larger tax benefit are more likely to participate in the TDRA. Our 
findings are consistent with the findings of Venti and Wise and Collins and Wyckoff. Collins and 
Wyckoff found the marginal tax rate elasticity of contribution to an IRA to be 0.24. In their study of 
factors affecting the likelihood of individuals to participate in an IRA over four different years (1979, 
1980, 1981 and 1982), O’Neil and Thompson found the marginal tax rate elasticity of contribution to 
an IRA ranging from 1.0447 to 0.466. Additionally our results are consistent with Becker and Fullerton 
and Sinai, Lin, and Robins. 
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Previous studies in economics have found significantly different patterns of participation among 
geographic regions (see International Foundation Information Center). A geographic location was 
included by dividing the 48 states into four distinct census regions (Northeast, South, Midwest, and 
West). Our regional delineation is similar to that of Collins and Wyckoff. The coefficients on R-
NEAST and R_WEST are positive and statistically significant. Results indicate that farms located in 
the Northeast and West regions are more likely to participate in TDRAs than farms located in the 
Southern Region (base group).  It is likely that the region variables represent the effects of omitted 
variables that are correlated with regional location (e.g., the intensity of TDRA advertising by financial 
institutions) of farm households. Our results confirm previous findings by O’Neil and Thompson; 
Collins and Wyckoff. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Farms families, like many other families in America, have diversified portfolios. Farm families hold 
both farm and nonfarm assets. Failure to plan carefully for retirement and ultimate transfer of the estate 
can result in serious problems such as financial insecurity, personal and family dissatisfaction, and 
needless capital losses. This study examined the effect of operator, source of income, and other 
demographic characteristics on the tax-deferred retirement savings of farm households using farm level 
data. The Double-Hurdle estimates indicate that some independent variables have significantly 
different impacts on the decision about whether to save in TDRAs and how much to save.  
 
Results from this study indicate that age of the operator, off-farm income, farm earnings, marginal tax 
rate, participation in government programs, and regional location of the farm household are important 
determinants in the TDRA participation decision. However, educational level, age of the operator,  14
marginal tax rate, and off-farm income are important factors that determine the level of TDRA savings. 
Additionally, our results confirm the life cycle hypothesis: farmers seem to accumulate wealth (in this 
case retirement savings) as they age and disinvest after achieving a specific age. The contribution of 
this study is important in three ways. First, this is the first study that has investigated the tax-deferred 
retirement savings behavior of farm households. Second, it uses national farm level data encompassing 
various regions of the U.S. Third, the estimation is more robust than simple logit analysis of 
participation in TDRA as it uses more information and a better procedure (Double-Hurdle) to estimate 
the underlying empirical model. While this study has some important contributions, there remain some 
unresolved issues. For example, the study uses estimated (or ad hoc) marginal tax rates. Ideally one 
would want to use the reported marginal tax rates. Given the large discrepancies observed between 
farm and non-farm household TDRA savings, it may also be useful to extend the model to non-farm 
households to determine how the motivating factors compare.  15
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Table 1: Tax-deferred retirement savings of farm, self-employed, and all non-farm families, by 











savings of all 
non-farm families 
  
Median value of holdings (dollars) 
 
All families  12,500 9,300 300
  
Income (current dollars)   
Less than 10,000  2,359 0 0
10,000-24,999 0 0 0
25,000-49,999 12,500 0 0
50,000-99,999 27,500 18,000 17,100
100,000 or more  55,000 109,000 80,000
      
Age of head (farm 
operator) years 
    
Less than 35  2,359 0 0
35-44 11,218 2,800 5,000
45-54 22,500 26,000 8,400
55-64 27,063 24,000 3,400
65 and older  4,500 16,500 0
      
Percentiles of net worth      
Less than 25
* 00 0
25-49.9 17,500 500 0
50-74.9 25,144 30,700 6,000
75-89.9 32,500 136,250 42,000
90-100 45,000 275,000 125,000
      
 
Sales Class 
    
Less than $250,000  0 1,800 NA
$250,000-$500,000 21,821 15,000 NA
Over $500,000  27,063 110,000 NA
Source: Farm families’ data from the 1999 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) and 
Nonfarm families’ data from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).  
 
* This represents the lowest quartile of farm households based on the value of their net worth. 
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Table 2: Variable definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable name  Description  Mean 
(Std. Dev) 
    
OP_EDUC  Education level of farm operator  13.0 
(26.87) 
OP_AGE  Age of the farm operator (years)  54.65 
(203.61) 
HH_SIZE  Size of farm operator household  2.76 
(21.03) 




MG_TAX  Marginal tax rate   0.189 
(1.99) 
NET_CASH  Net cash income from farming ($0,000) 1.539 
(166.43) 
GOVT_PMT  =1 if the farm household received 
government payments, 0 otherwise 
0.41 
(7.411) 
R_NEAST  =1 if the farm is located in the Northeast 
region of the U.S., 0 otherwise 
0.07 
(3.64) 
R_MWEST  =1 if the farm is located in the Midwest 
region of the U.S., 0 otherwise 
0.38 
(7.31) 
R_WEST  =1 if the farm is located in the West region 
of the U.S., 0 otherwise 
0.43 
(7.44) 
R_SOUTH  =1 if the farm is located in the South 






Table 3: Estimated Parameters of the Double-Hurdle Model 
 
Double-Hurdle Model   
Variable name  Probit 
coefficient  Marginal effect  TDRA 
investment  Marginal effect 




(0.206)   
OP_EDUC 0.083 
(0.073)  0.031  0.0718** 
(0.007)  0.062 
OP_AGE 0.045*** 
(0.007)  0.017  0.070*** 
(0.0060)  0.039 
OP_AGESQ -0.0004** 
(0.0002)  -0.0001  -0.0006** 
(0.0000)  -0.0003 
HH_SIZE 0.006 
(0.011)  0.002  0.007 
(0.061)  0.012 
OF_WAGE 0.007** 
(0.003)  0.003  0.017** 
(0.009)  0.010 
MG_TAX 1.349*** 
(0.125)  0.500  1.543*** 
(0.101)  0.766 
NET_CASH -0.0005*** 
(0.0001)  -0.002   -0.0003 
(0.0004)  -0.001 
GOVT_PMT -0.063** 
(0.023)  -0.024  0.040 
(0.027)  0.022 
R_NEAST 0.157*** 
(0.058)  0.057  0.151** 
(0.042)  0.021 
R_MWEST 0.272 
(0.117)  0.096  0.039 
(0.051)  0.081 
R_WEST 0.107** 
(0.037)  0.039  0.007 
(0.032)  0.004 
       
σ     99.8** 
-Log L  5531  1172 
Correct prediction     64%     
 
Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors. Single, Double and Triple asterisks indicate statistical 
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level.  
 